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Abstract: Extending Gali and Monacelli (2004), we build an N-country open
economy model, where each economy is subject to sticky wages and prices and,
potentially, has access to sales and income taxes as well as government spending
as ﬁscal instruments. We examine an economy either as a small open economy
operating under ﬂexible exchange rates or as a member of a monetary union. In
a small open economy when all three ﬁscal instruments are freely available, we
show analytically that the welfare impact of technology and mark-up shocks can
be completely eliminated (in the sense that policy can replicate the eﬃcient ﬂex
price equilibrium), whether policy acts with discretion or commitment. How-
ever, once any one of these ﬁscal instruments is excluded as a stabilisation tool,
costs can emerge. Using simulations, we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal instrument
in this case (in the sense of reducing the welfare costs of the shock) is either
income taxes or sales taxes. In constrast, having government spending as an
instrument contributes very little.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union does not respond)
are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely available, the
technology shock will incur welfare costs. Government spending is potentially
useful as a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for
monetary policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes at
reducing the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. If all three
taxes are available, they can reduce the impact of the technology shock on the
union member by around a half, compared to the case where ﬁscal policy is not
used.
Finally we consider the robustness of these results to two extensions. Firstly,
introducing government debt, such that policy makers take account of the debt
consequences of using ﬁscal instruments as stabilisation devices, and, secondly,
introducing implementation lags in the use of ﬁscal instruments. We ﬁnd that
the need for debt sustainability has a very limited impact on the use of ﬁscal
instruments for stabilisation purposes, while implementation lags can reduce,
but not eliminate, the gains from ﬁscal stabilisation.
JEL Codes: E32, E60 and F41.
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1O v e r v i e w
There has been a wealth of recent work deriving optimal monetary policy for
both closed and open economies utilising New Classical Keynesian Synthesis
models where the structural model and the description of policy makers’ objec-
tives are consistently microfounded. (See for example, Woodford (2003) for a
comprehensive treatment of the closed economy case, and Clarida et al (2001)
for its extension to the open economy case.) More recently, some papers have
extended this analysis to include various forms of active ﬁscal policy, although
only a few in the context of open economies or a monetary union.1 Even when
ﬁscal policy has been analysed, however, the number of active ﬁscal instruments
considered has tended to be small (generally one, occasionally two). This omis-
sion is important since diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments have quite diﬀerent eﬀects,
and their eﬃcacy varies across shocks and policy regimes, as we show below.
Additionally, when ﬁscal instruments are introduced they are typically assumed
to be as ﬂexible as interest rates, which may give a misleading indication of their
eﬀectiveness.This omission is important since diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments have
quite diﬀerent eﬀects, and their eﬃcacy varies across shocks and policy regimes.
Additionally, when ﬁscal instruments are introduced they are typically assumed
to be as ﬂexible as interest rates.
The focus on monetary policy rather than a combination of monetary and
ﬁs c a lp o l i c yp r o b a b l yr e ﬂects three factors. The ﬁrst is that, when the only nom-
inal inertia in the economy involves price setting, optimal monetary policy can
completely oﬀset the impact of technology or preference shocks (by reproducing
the ﬂex price equilibrium) if exchange rates are ﬂexible. However, this is no
longer the case if there is also inertia in nominal wage setting, and we allow for
both forms of nominal inertia in this paper. As we shall show, this introduces
an important potential role for using tax as a stabilisation instrument. Sec-
ond, there is much less ﬂexibility in moving ﬁscal policy instruments, although
this inﬂexibility varies between countries (and instruments), and may not be
immutable. In this paper we explicitly examine the costs of this inﬂexibility,
either by introducing implementation lags, or by ruling out the use of particular
instruments completely. A third concern may be that using ﬁscal instruments
for stabilisation may compromise the control of public sector debt. Although
1For example, Sutherland (2004) and Beetsma and Jensen (2004).
2this may involve political economy concerns which are outside the scope of this
paper, we do generalise our model to include public sector debt.
We consider open economies in which there are three potential ﬁscal instru-
ments alongside monetary policy: government spending, income taxes and sales
taxes. As well as the small open economy case, we also consider the case of
an individual member of a monetary union, using a framework set out in Gali
and Monacelli (2004) (henceforth GM). We examine optimal policies when all
ﬁscal instruments are available and fully ﬂexible (under commitment or discre-
tion), and then look at the impact on welfare if there are lags in using these
instruments, or if only a subset of instruments are available for short term sta-
bilisation.
Our benchmark regime is for a small open economy, when all three ﬁscal
instruments are freely available. Here we can show analytically that the ﬁrst-
best solution can be achieved. However, once any one of these ﬁscal instruments
is excluded as a stabilisation tool, signiﬁcant costs emerge. Using simulations,
we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal instrument in this case (in the sense of reducing
the welfare costs of a technology shock) is either income taxes or sales taxes.
In constrast, having government spending as an instrument contributes very
little. This is also true of mark-up shocks, where only a tax instrument which
can directly oﬀset the inﬂationary pressures created by the shock is eﬀective in
dealing with the shock.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union has no reason to
respond) are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely avail-
able, the technology shock will imply that variables deviate from their eﬃcient
levels, implying welfare costs. Government spending is potentially useful as
a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for monetary
policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes at reducing
the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. For both a small open
economy and a monetary union member, we ﬁnd that implementation/reaction
lags signiﬁcantly reduce, but do not eliminate, the welfare beneﬁts of ﬁscal
stabilisation.
Initially, our analysis assumes the existence of a lump sum tax whose sole
purpose is to balance the budget each period. As Ricardian Equivalence holds,
changes in this tax have no impact on the economy, but allow us to ignore
the government’s budget constraint in our analysis. In an extension to our
model, we consider the case where lump-sum taxes are not available to oﬀset the
consequences for the government’s budget constraint of using ﬁscal instruments
as stabilisation devices. Allowing for the impact of changes in policy on debt
has only a small impact on our results. This is because it is optimal either to
accomodate the impact of ﬁscal shocks on debt (i.e. debt has a random walk
character, as in Benigno and Woodford (2005)), or that the optimal speed for
correcting debt disequilibrium is slow (see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005a)).
Our next section derives the model. Section 3 outlines the social planner’s
problem such that we can write our model in ‘gap’ form. This representation of
t h em o d e lc a na l s ob eu s e dt od e r i v eaq u a d r a t i ca p p r o x i m a t i o nt ow e l f a r e .I n
3section 4 we derive the optimal pre-commitment policies for the open economy
and for a continuum of economies participating in monetary union. Section
5 simulates such economies to quantify the relative contribution of alternative
ﬁscal instruments to macroeconomic stability. In this section we also consider
the importance of implementation lags in relation to ﬁscal variables. Section
6 adds government debt to the model and assesses the importance of the con-
straints imposed by the need for ﬁscal solvency. A conclusion summarises the
main results.
2 The Model
This section outlines our model. We focus on the economic problems facing
economic agents in a single ‘home’ economy, but it should be noted this economy
exists in a world economy containing an inﬁnite number of economies which are
symmetrical to this one. We shall consider optimal policy when such economies
operate under ﬂexible exchange rates or when they form a monetary union. As
noted above, our model is similar in structure to GM, but we allow for the
existence of sticky wages as well as prices and introduce distortionary sales and
income taxes. The model is further extended by introducing government debt
in section 6.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one, who diﬀer in that they pro-
vide diﬀerentiated labour services to ﬁrms in their economy. However, we shall
assume full asset markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the
same budget constraint and make the same consumption plans even if they face
diﬀerent wage rates due to stickiness in wage-setting. As a result the typical






where C,G and N are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and
labour supply respectively. Here the only notation referring to the speciﬁc
household, k, indexes the labour input, as full ﬁnancial markets will imply that
all other variables are constant across households.






(1 − α)(1−α)αα (2)
where, if we drop the time subscript, all variables are commensurate. CH is a






























which implies that public goods are all domestically produced. The elasticity of
substitution between varieties ²>1 is common across countries. The parameter
α is (inversely) related to the degree of home bias in preferences, and is a natural
measure of openness.









= Πt + Dt + WtN(k)t(1 − τt) − Tt
where Pi,t(j) is the price of variety j imported from country i expressed in
home currency, Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end of
period t, Π is the representative household’s share of proﬁts in the imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms, W are wages, τ is an wage income tax rate, and T are lump
sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoﬀs.
Households must ﬁrst decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimises the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure

























PH(j)CH(j)dj = PHCH (11)
Z 1
0
Pi(j)Ci(j)dj = PiCi (12)














This implies Z 1
0
PiCidi = PFCF (15)
Optimisation between imported and domestically produced goods implies
PHCH =( 1 − α)PC (16)






is the consumer price index (CPI). The budget constraint can therefore be
rewritten as
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt + Dt + WtN(k)t(1 − τt) − Tt (19)
2.1.1 Households’ Intertemporal Consumption Problem
The ﬁrst of the household’s intertemporal problems involves allocating consump-
tion expenditure across time. For tractability assume (following GM) that (1)









In addition, assume that the elasticity of substitution between the baskets of
foreign goods produced in diﬀerent countries is η =1(this is equivalent to
adopting logarithmic utility in the aggregation of such baskets).
We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (19) to obtain
















6where Rt = 1
Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
oﬀ a unit of domestic currency in t+1 . This is the familiar consumption Euler
equation which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption
over time such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods
(after allowing for tilting due to interest rates diﬀering from the households’
rate of time preference).
A log-linearised version of (22) can be written as
ct = Et{ct+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) (23)
where lowercase denotes logs (with an important exception for g noted below),
ρ = 1
β − 1,a n dπt = pt − pt−1 is consumer price inﬂation.
2.1.2 Households’ Wage-Setting Behaviour
We now need to consider the wage-setting behaviour of households. We assume
that ﬁrms need to employ a CES aggregate of the labour of all households in
the domestic production of consumer goods. This is provided by an ‘aggregator’










where N(k) is the labour provided by household k to the aggregator. We
allow the degree of labour diﬀerentiation to vary in response to iid shocks which
introduce the possibility of wage mark-up shocks. Accordingly the demand







where N is the CES aggregate of labour services in the economy which also





where N(j) is the labour employed by ﬁrm j. The price of this labour is given























7where Λt+s = C
−1





N is the demand curve for the household’s labour. The ﬁrst order
condition from this problem can be combined with the aggregate wage index












t is the wage-markup in the absence of wage
stickiness2. Note that the forcing variable in this New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC) is a log-linearsed measure of the extent to which wages are not at the
level implied by the labour supply decision that would hold under ﬂexible wages.
2.2 Price and Exchange Rate Identities














(pi − pH)di (32)





Using the deﬁnition of the eﬀective terms of trade this can be rewritten as,
P = PHSα (34)
or in logs as
p = pH + αs (35)
where s = pF − pH is the logged terms of trade. By taking ﬁrst-diﬀerences it
follows that,
πt = πH,t + α(st − st−1) (36)
There is assumed to be free-trade in goods, such that the law of one price
holds for individual goods at all times. This implies,
Pi(j)=εiPi
i(j) (37)
2A time subscript has been added to what would otherwise be the steady-state wage mark-
up to reﬂe c tt h a tf a c tt h a tw es h a l ls u b j e c tt h i sv a r i a b l et oi i dm a r k - u ps h o c k sb e l o w .
8where εi is the bilateral nominal exchange rate and Pi
i(j) is the price of county





































= e + p∗ (42)
where e =
R 1
0 eidi is the log of the nominal eﬀective exchange rate, pi
i is the
logged domestic price index for country i, and p∗ =
R 1
0 pi
idi is the log of the
world price index. For the world as a whole there is no distinction between
consumer prices and the domestic (world) price level.
Combining the deﬁnition of the terms of trade and the result just obtained
gives
s = pF − pH (43)
= e + p∗ − pH (44)
Now consider the link between the terms of trade and the real exchange
rate. (Note that although we have free trade and the law of one price holds for
individual goods, our economies do not exhibit PPP since there is a home bias
in the consumption of home and foreign goods. PPP only holds if we eliminate
this home bias and assume α → 1 since this implies that the share of home
goods in consumption is the same as any other country’s i.e. inﬁnitesimally





where Pi and P are the two countries respective CPI price levels. In logged




(ei + pi − p)di (46)
= e + p∗ − p (47)
= s + pH − p (48)
=( 1 − α)s (49)
92.3 International Risk Sharing
Assuming symmetric initial conditions (e.g. zero net foreign assets, structurally
similar economies etc) and equating the ﬁrst order conditions (focs) for con-






















where zi is a constant which depends upon initial conditions. Log-linearising
and integrating over all countries yields,
c = c∗ + q (52)
where c∗ =
R 1
0 cidi,or using the relationship between the terms of trade and the
real exchange rate,
c = c∗ +( 1− α)s (53)
2.4 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising
total costs,
R 1







The production function is linear, so for ﬁrm j
Y (j)=AN(j) (55)














)di + G] (56)




























10where κ is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-
state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary sales
and income taxes (assuming there is a lump-sum tax available to ﬁnance such
a subsidy) and τs is a sales tax. 1 − θ is the probability of a price change in a
given period. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) detail the derivation of the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) based on this optimisation, which is given
by,
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + λ(mct +l n ( µt)) (59)
whereλ =
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ and mc = −a + w − pH − ln(1 − τs) − v are the real
log-linearised marginal costs of production, and v = −ln(1−κ). In the absence
of sticky prices proﬁt maximising behaviour implies, mc = −ln(µ) where µ is
the price mark-up, which will be subject to iid shocks below.
2.6 Equilibrium



























)di + G] (62)









allows us to write









)di + G (64)




= CSα + G (66)
Taking logs implies
ln(Y − G)=c + αs (67)




= y − g (69)
11w h e r ew ed e ﬁne g = −ln(1 − G
Y ). As this condition holds for all countries, we




(ci + gi + αsi)di (70)
However
R 1




(ci + gi)di = c∗ + g∗ (71)
We can use these relationships to rewrite (23) as
yt = Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πt+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} − αEt{st+1 − st}
= Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} (72)






(ϕnt − wt + ct + pt − ln(1 − τt)+l n ( µw
t )) (73)
Here the forcing variable captures the extent to which the consumer’s labour
supply decision is not the same as it would be under ﬂexible wages. Deﬁne this
variable as mcw = ϕnt − wt + ct + pt − ln(1 − τt). This can be manipulated as
follows,
mcw = ϕn − w + pH + c + p − pH − ln(1 − τ) (74)
= ϕn − w + pH + c + αs − ln(1 − τ) (75)
= ϕy − (w − pH)+c∗ + s − ln(1 − τ) − ϕa (76)
From above we had
y = c∗ + g + s (77)
so we can also write marginal costs appropriate to wage inﬂation as
mcw =( 1+ϕ)y − (w − pH) − ln(1 − τ) − g − ϕa (78)
2.7 Summary of Model
We are now in a position to summarise our model. On the demand side we have
an Euler equation for consumption,
yt = Et{yt+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − ρ) − Et{gt+1 − gt} (79)
On the supply side there are equations for price inﬂation,
πH,t = βEt{πH,t+1} + λ(mct +l n ( µt)) (80)
12where λ =[ ( 1− βθ)(1 − θ)]/θ and mc = −a + w − pH − ln(1 − τs) − v.T h e r e









which together determine the evolution of real wages,
wt − pH,t = πw
H,t − πH,t + wt−1 − pH,t−1 (82)
There are symmetrical equations describing behaviour in the other economies.
The model is then closed by the policy maker specifying the appropriate values
of the ﬁscal and monetary policy variables. However, although this represents
a fully speciﬁed model it is often recast in the form of ‘gap’ variables which are
more consistent with utility-based measures of welfare.
2.8 Gap variables
Deﬁne the natural level of (log) output yn as the level that would occur in the
absence of nominal inertia and conditional on the optimal choice of government
spending, steady-state tax rates and the actual level of world output. Deﬁne
the output gap as
yg = y − yn (83)
With ﬂexible prices and wages we have mcn = −ln(µ) and mcw,n = −ln(µw)
which can be solved (see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b)) for the natural level
of output,
yn = a + gn/(1 + ϕ)+( v +l n ( 1− τ) − ln(µ) − ln(µw))/(1 + ϕ) (84)
where τ is the steady-state income tax rat e . W ec a nt h e nw r i t et h ef o r c i n g
variable for wage inﬂation in ‘gap’ form as,
mcw,g = mcw +l n ( µw
t ) (85)
=( 1 + ϕ)y − (rw) − ln(1 − τ) − g − ϕa +l n ( µw
t ) (86)
=( 1 + ϕ)yg − gg − rwg − ln(1 − τ)g + uw
t (87)
where ln(1−τ)g =l n ( 1−τ)−ln(1−τ) is the tax gap,u w
t =l n (
µw
t
µw) is the wage
mark-up shock and real wages are deﬁned as rw =l n (W
PH). Substituting this












t − ln(1 − τt)g + uw
t ) (88)
A similar expression for price inﬂation is given by,
πH,t = βEt{πH,t+1} + λ[rw
g
t − ln(1 − τs
t)g] (89)




H,t − πH,t + rw
g
t−1 − ∆at (90)









t = ρ + Et{yn
t+1 − yn
t } − Et{gn
t+1 − gn
t } (92)
This allows us to write (72) for gap variables as
y
g
t = yt − yn
t = Et{y
g
t+1} − (rt − Et{πH,t+1} − rn





Note that, given (84), the real natural rate of interest depends - like natural
output - only on the productivity shock, the steady-state levels of distortionary
taxation and the optimal level of government spending.
3 Optimal policy
3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem in a Small Open Econ-
omy.
In deriving welfare it is helpful to begin by considering the social planner’s
problem. The social planner simply decides how to allocate consumption and
production of goods within the economy, subject to the various constraints
implied by operating as part of a larger group of economies e.g. IRS. Since they
are concerned with real allocations, the social planner ignores market prices and,
therefore, nominal inertia and distortionary taxes in describing optimal policy.
The social planner’s optimisation therefore provides a natural benchmark for
considering optimal policy in the presence of nominal inertia and distortionary
taxation. GM demonstrate that the solution to the social planner’s problem is
given by,





1 − α + χ
(95)
which implies the optimal value for g,




143.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Having considered the social planner’s problem we now proceed to compare this
to the decentralised equilibrium in our economy assuming there is no nominal
inertia. We do this for two reaons. Firstly, it allows us to deﬁne the subsidy
required to eliminate the distortions that would otherwise render our steady-
state ineﬃcient. Imposing this subsidy eliminates the usual inﬂationary bias
problems that would otherwise emerge and allows us to focus on stabilisation
policy. Secondly, by then contrasting the outcome under nominal inertia with
this ﬂex price solution we can derive a measure of welfare which captures the
extent to which such frictions have been overcome by stabilisation policy.
Proﬁt-maximising behaviour, under ﬂexible prices and wages, implies that





















1 − α + χ
(98)
and if the subsidy κ is given by






)(1 − τs)(1 − τ)/(1 − α) (99)
then
Nn =( 1− α + χ)
1
1+ϕ (100)
and employment is identical to the optimal level of employment above. Here the
subsidy has to overcome the distortions due to monopoly pricing in the goods
and labour markets, as well as the distortionary income and sales taxes.
3.3 The Social Planner’s Problem in a Monetary Union
Here the social planner maximises utility across all countries subject to
Y i = AiNi (101)






i dj + Gi (102)















15GM demonstrate that optimisation implies






















The latter implies gi =l n ( 1+χ) which is a diﬀerent ﬁscal rule than in the
case of the small open economy. Why? In the small open economy case gov-
ernments have an incentive to increase government spending (which is devoted
solely to domestically produced goods) to induce an appreciation in the terms
of trade (see the discussion in GM). In aggregate this cannot happen, but it
leaves government spending ineﬃciently high. The government spending rule
under monetary union eliminates this externality. This also has implications for
the derivation of union and national welfare which are discussed below.
3.4 Social Welfare
Utilising the eﬃciency results considered above, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b)

































where e λw = λw
1+ϕ²w. It contains quadratic terms in price and wage inﬂation
reﬂecting the costs of price and wage dispersion induced by price and wage in-
ﬂation in the presence of nominal inertia, as well as terms in the output gap and
government spending gap. The weights attached to each element are a function
of model parameters. The key to obtaining this quadratic speciﬁcation is the
employment subsidy which eliminates the distortions caused by imperfect com-
petition in labour and product markets as well as the impact of distortionary
sales and income taxes. It then becomes optimal to utilise policy instruments
to attempt to mimic the ﬂexible price response to shocks. It is also impor-
tant to note that it is assumed that national ﬁscal authorities have internalised
the externality caused by their desire to appreciate the terms of trade through
excessive government expenditure.
In deriving national welfare for an economy outside of monetary union this
externality is not corrected. It can be shown that the objective function for
16country i becomes,
Ψi = −



























which is in the same form as the union-wide welfare function. However it diﬀers
in the ﬁrst term multiplying the objective function and in the deﬁnition of the
eﬃcient steady-state around which the ‘gapped’ variables are deﬁned, which
reﬂects the externality which is accepted as a fact of life outside of EMU, but
which we assume is eliminated within EMU.
4 Precommitment Policy
In this section we shall consider precommitment policies for the various variants
of our model.
4 . 1 P r e c o m m i t m e n ti nt h eS m a l lO p e nE c o n o m y
We shall initially consider policy in an economy not participating in monetary
union. Aside from a direct interest in assessing the potential role for stabilising
ﬁscal policy within a small open economy under ﬂexible exchange rates, this
is also informative as union-wide monetary policy will be of the same form as
national monetary policy in the open economy. In the small open economy case






































t (πi,t − βEt{πi,t+1} − λ[rwi,g − ln(1 − τ
i,s


































t are associated with
the constraints given by the NKPC for wage inﬂation, the NKPC for price
inﬂation, the euler equation for consumption and the evolution of real wages,




When there is a national monetary policy it is as if the monetary authorities
have control over consumption such that the consumption Euler equation ceases




i.e. the price Phillips curve ceases to be a constraint on maximising welfare
- sales tax changes can oﬀset the impact of any other variables driving price




The remaining focs are for real wages,
−λλ
π,i













































and the output gap,
2(1 + ϕ)y
i,g








Combinations of these ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the target criteria for a
variety of cases, such that alternative ﬁscal regimes are modelled by retaining
or dropping the focs associated with a speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument. In deriving
precommiment policy we consider the general solution to the system of focs
after the initial time period, which gives us a set of target criteria which policy
must achieve. In the initial period we have two ways of solving the system
of focs. We can derive a set of initial values for lagrange multipliers dated at
time t=-1, such that the target criteria are also followed in the initial period -
this constitutes what is known as the policy from a ‘timeless perspective’ (see
Woodford 2003). Alternatively we can allow policy makers to exploit the fact
that expectations are ﬁxed in the initial period and utilise the discretionary
solution for the initial period only. This amounts to setting the time t=-1 dated
lagrange multipliers to zero (see Currie and Levine (1993)). Although we adopt
the latter approach in simulations, we do not report the focs associated with
the initial period since these do not provide any additional economic intuition.
184.1.1 Small Open Economy - All Fiscal Instruments
Let us consider the case where the ﬁscal authorities have access to government
spending and both tax instruments in order to stabilise their economy, when
operating alongside the national monetary authorities. Leith and Wren-Lewis














In other words the eﬀects of shocks on these gap variables are completely oﬀset
and do not have any welfare implications. Since these target criteria are all
static, it will also be the case that the optimal discretionary policy will be the
same as this precommitment policy. In terms of policy assignments, monetary
policy ensures the output gap is zero. Wage inﬂation is eliminated by the
















This shows that with appropriate ﬁscal instruments available for stabilisation
purposes cost push-shocks become trivial to deal with, in contrast to the stan-
dard case where they are the shocks that imply the monetary authorities face a
trade-oﬀ in stabilising output and inﬂation (see, Clarida et al (1999) for exam-
ple).
Appendix I details the target criteria for other sub-sets of ﬁscal instruments3.
A key result to note is that as we remove ﬁscal instruments the need to add
inertia into target criteria grows. If all ﬁscal instruments are removed, we are
left with the mixture of forward and backward-looking target criteria found in
Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) in the case where both prices and wages are sticky.
4.2 Optimal Precommitment Under EMU:
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The key diﬀerence between this and the previous problem is that we now have
a union-wide interest rate and welfare is integrated across all member states.
As a result, we no longer have a foc for the national interest rate, but the foc





t di =0 (125)
However, since all economies in our model are symmetrical in structure, we
can aggregate focs across our economies which delivers, in terms of union-wide
aggregates, an identical set of focs as we ﬁnd in the small open economy case
above. Therefore, the target criterion for the ECB will take the same form as
that attributed to the national monetary authority, but re-speciﬁed in terms of
union-wide aggregates.
In terms of national focs, these are identical to conditions (112)-(118) above.
4.2.1 EMU Case - All Fiscal Instruments
With all ﬁscal instruments, but with the loss of the monetary policy instrument,
we can no-longer eliminate the welfare eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore
our policy conﬁguration is no longer trivial. Solving focs (112)-(118) yields the









which ensures the optimal composition of output. There is an income tax rule,




which replicates the labour supply decision that would emerge under ﬂexible
wages and thereby eliminates wage inﬂation, and a sales tax rule,
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which achieves the appropriate balance between output and inﬂation while
recognising that competitiveness will need to be restored once any shock has
passed. Again mark-up shocks are trivially dealt with by the appropriate tax
instrument.
With these ﬁscal rules in place in each member state, the ECB will act to
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20which will imply that the average government spending gap and rates of price
and wage inﬂation will all be zero in the union.
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) detail the target criteria that emerge using
sub-sets of ﬁscal instruments and these results are summarised in Appendix II.
As before, as we eliminate ﬁscal instruments the target criteria to be achieved
by the remaining policy instruments become more dynamic reﬂecting the need
to adopt an inertial policy under commitment in order to anchor expectations
in a welfare improving way.
5 Optimal Policy Simulations
In this section we examine the optimal policy response to a technology shock
both within and outside monetary union. We consider discretionary and com-
mitment policies and compute the welfare beneﬁts of employing our various ﬁscal
instruments as stabilisation devices. Following GM we adopt the following pa-
rameter set, ϕ =1 , µ =1 .2, ² =6 , θ =0 .75, β =0 .99, α =0 .4, and γ =0 .25.
The ratio of government spending to gdp of 0.25 implies that χ =
γ
1−γ =1 /3
in the EMU case4. Additionally, since we have sticky wages we need to adopt a
measure of the steady-state mark-up in the labour market. Following evidence
in Leith and Malley (2005), we choose µw =1 .2 (which implies ²w =6 ) ,a n da
degree of wage stickiness given by θw =0 .75, which means that wage contracts




t−1 + ξt (130)
where we adopt a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of ρa =0 .6,
although we consider the implications of greater persistence below.
5.1 Small Open Economy Simulations
We begin by considering the response of a small open economy to a 1% tech-
nology shock with the degree of persistence described above, when no use is
made of ﬁscal policy for stabilisation purposes, so only monetary policy is used
to stabilise the economy. Figure 1 details the responses of key endogenous vari-
ables to the technology shock, under discretion5. It is important to note that,
in the absence of sticky wages, monetary policy could completely oﬀset the
welfare consequences of this shock by reducing interest rates in line with the
increase in productivity. This would ensure that domestic and foreign demand
4In the small open economy case, γ =
χ
1−α+χ such that ﬁxing the share of government
spending requires a rescaling of χ to take account of the incentive to excessive government
spending which is assumed to be eliminated within the union. In the simulations, to facilitate
comparisons, we ﬁx χ at the value described above in both the open economy and EMU cases.
5The same shock under commitment introduces a slightly more inertial policy response,
but is qualitatively very similar and can be found in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b). The
numerical solution of optimal policy under commitment and discretion is based on Soderlind
(1999).
21rises for the additional products and that the full eﬀects of the productivity
gain are captured in real wages. However, when nominal wages are also sticky
it is not possible for monetary policy alone to oﬀset the eﬀects of the shock.
Wage stickiness means that real wages are slow to rise following the positive
productivity shock and, as a result, marginal costs fall initially and this means
that the initial jump in inﬂation is negative. This leads to a cut in nominal
interest rates (greater than that implied by the productivity shock’s aﬀect on
the natural interest rate) and a jump depreciation of the nominal exchange rate,
although interest rates will be relatively lower after this initial jump as rising
marginal costs increase inﬂation. The terms of trade depreciate initially, but
this is far more modest than in the ﬂexible wage case. As a result consumption
rises in the home country relative to abroad, but not by as much as output
since the depreciation of the terms of trade makes domestic goods attractive
to foreign consumers. Implicitly IRS and the positive productivity shock imply
that resources are being sent abroad to support foreign consumption, although
this is not as pronounced as in the ﬂexible wage case.
We know from our derivation of optimal policy above that when we utilise
all ﬁscal instruments we can completely oﬀset the impact of this shock on all
welfare-relevant gap variables, implying that there is no additional welfare cost
to the shock arising because of the various frictions in our economy. Essentially,
the monetary instrument eliminates the impact on the output gap of the shock
by cutting interest rates. This creates demand for domestically produced goods
by encouraging domestic consumption, which has a bias towards domestically
produced goods, and depreciating the exchange rate leading to an increase in
foreign demand. Income taxes are reduced to eliminate wage inﬂation, but
simultaneously achieve the required increase in the post tax real wage. The
sales tax is increased to eliminate the deﬂation that would otherwise emerge
as a result of the reduction in marginal costs (due to falling income taxes and
rising productivity). There is no need to adjust government spending when the
government has access to the tax instruments without constraint.
We can also consider a number of intermediate cases where not all ﬁscal
instruments are employed. The welfare beneﬁts of various combinations of ﬁscal
instrument are given in Table 16. These suggest that the greatest gains to
stabilisation in the open economy case come from the tax instruments, with
only relatively minor beneﬁts from varying government spending. Either tax
instrument is highly eﬀective in reducing the welfare costs of the technology
shock.
Table 1 - Costs of Technology Shock in Small Open Economy with Alterna-
tive Fiscal Instruments.
6The ﬁgures in Tables 1-2 and 4 capture the costs of deviating from the eﬃcient level of
variables due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of the particular shock, expressed as a
percentage of one-period’s steady-state consumption. In Table 3 the ﬁgures are a percentage
of every period’s steady-state consumption.
22No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Commitment Policy
Govt Spending 0.5793 0.0673 0.0863 0
No Govt Spending 0.5804 0.0708 0.0915 0
Discretionary Policy
Govt Spending 0.5824 0.1051 0.1356 0
No Govt Spending 0.5835 0.1082 0.1412 0
In Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) we also consider the costs of wage and
price mark-up shocks. There we show that, as we might expect from the analy-
sis above, such shocks can be eﬀectively dealt with with the appropriate tax
instruments, but the inappropriate ﬁscal instrument does little to oﬀset these
mark-up shocks.
5.2 EMU Simulations
We now consider the response to an idiosyncratic technology shock for a country
operating under EMU (see Figure 2). We begin by considering the case where
there is no ﬁscal response to the shock. In this case the equilibriating mechanism
is the need to restore competitiveness following the shock. Relative to the small
open economy case, there is now no monetary policy response to either the
local productivity shock or its inﬂationary repercussions. As a result there is
no attempt to boost consumption and output with a fall in interest rates in
response to the shock (in an attempt to replicate the ﬂex price outcome). There
is an initial fall in marginal costs and inﬂation which induces a depreciation
in the terms of trade, although this is far smaller than in the open economy
case above. This shifts demand towards domestic goods such that prices and
wages rise until the competitiveness gain has been reversed. In the presence of
nominal inertia and with no monetary policy/exchange rate instrument, it is
diﬃcult to induce the necessary movements in the terms of trade/real exchange
rate to create a market for the extra goods that can be produced as a result of
the productivity shock. This failure is reﬂected in the large negative output gap
and real wage gap.
We then contrast this to the case where country i employs all the ﬁscal in-
struments at its disposal in Figure 37.W e ﬁnd that optimal policy attempts
to reduce the impact of the technology shock on competitiveness. Therefore,
following the technology shock, sales and income taxes are increased. The latter
completely oﬀsets the impact of the shock on wage inﬂation, while the former al-
lows for only a very limited reduction in prices following the productivity shock.
As a result of this attempt to avoid price adjustment, there is a substantial
negative output gap, although this is partially oﬀset by a rise in government
spending. This has the advantage of creating a market for the additional goods,
which given complete home bias in government spending, boosts real wages and
7F i g u r e3a l s oc o n s i d e r st h eu s eo fﬁscal instruments when there are no lump-sum taxes
available to balance the budget following shocks. For a discussion of this case, see Section 6
below.
23moderates the fall in inﬂation. There is now a smaller depreciation of the terms
of trade due to the changes in taxation and the increase in government spend-
ing. As we note below, the welfare gain from ﬁscal stabilisation to this degree
is an approximate halving of the costs of a technology shock when part of a
monetary union.
We again consider a number of intermediate cases where not all ﬁscal in-
struments are employed. The welfare beneﬁts of various combinations of ﬁscal
instrument are given in Table 2. This suggests that the greatest gains to stabil-
isation, when part of monetary union, come from utilising government spending
as a stabilisation instrument. This is due to the assumed home-bias in gov-
ernment spending which allows policy makers to purchase the additional goods
produced as a result of the productivity shock without requiring any competive-
ness changes which subsequently have to be undone once the shock has passed.
It is also interesting to note that even with all ﬁscal instruments in place the
costs of the shock under EMU are still greater than in the small open economy
case with just monetary policy as the only available policy instrument.
Table 2- Costs of Technology Shock Under EMU with Alternative Fiscal Instru-
ments8.
Commitment Policy No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Govt Spending 1.6707 1.6050 1.2089 1.1486
No Govt Spending 2.3121 2.1495 1.9988 1.8487
Discretionary Policy No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Govt Spending 1.6755 1.6115 1.2131 1.1486
No Govt Spending 2.3121 2.1537 2.0073 1.8487
The above Table shows the costs of our 1% autocorrelated technology shock,
expressed as a percentage of one-period’s steady-state consumption.What would
be the equivalent numbers for an historically representative set of shocks, rather
than a 1% technology shock? Smets and Wouters (2005) have estimated the
stochastic properties of shocks hitting the complete Euro area. We focus on
three of these shocks: namely price and wage mark-up shocks which are taken
to be iid shocks, and an autocorrelated productivity shock. If we subject our
model of a small open economy to these shocks, we ﬁnd that the gains from
optimal ﬁscal stabilisation (compared to no ﬁscal action) are 2.4% of steady state
consumption. Making the even more heroic assumption that these shocks can be
applied to our model of an individual union member, we ﬁnd that optimal ﬁscal
stabilisation reduces their costs from 2.9% to 1.9% of steady-state consumption
(for details of these calculations see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b))- see Table
3.
8The ﬁgures in Table 2 capture the costs of deviating from the eﬃcient level of variables
due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of the particular shock, expressed as a percentage
of one-period’s steady-state consumption.
24Table 3 - Beneﬁts of Fiscal Stabilisation9
Beneﬁts of Fiscal Stabilisation No Fiscal Response Full Fiscal Response
Small Open Economy 2.37% 0%
Monetary Union 3.91% 1.90%
5.3 Implementation Lags
A frequently cited argument against employing ﬁscal instruments in a stabil-
isation role is that it often takes long periods to implement the tax changes
and government spending changes suggested by optimal policy. In this sub-
section we assess the extent to which implementation lags aﬀect the welfare
gains from ﬁscal stabilisation. We assume that it takes n-periods to change pol-
icy instruments following a change in the information set. This can be modelled
by conditioning policy instruments on information sets of n-periods ago, such















the similar expression for price inﬂation,
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The equation describing the evolution of the ‘gapped’ real wage is unaﬀected.
This implies that it will take n-periods following the shock for the ﬁscal author-
i t i e st ob ea b l et oi m p l e m e n taﬁscal policy plan. In assessing the impact on
such implementation lags on welfare we consider four cases: (1) There are no
lags in adjusting ﬁscal instruments; (2) there is a one period lag in adjusting
tax instruments and 2 periods in adjusting government spending; (3) there is
a two period lag in adjusting tax instruments and a one year lag in adjusting
government spending; and (4) ﬁscal instruments are not changed over the course
of the business cycle.
In Table 4 below we look at these four cases for a currency union member. It
is clear that implementation lags do reduce the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal instruments
as stabilisation devices. However, there are still non-trivial beneﬁts from ﬁscal
stabilisation even under the ‘slow response’ scenario. This is in part because
expectations that instruments will change in the future will impact on private
sector decisions today in a forward looking model.
9The ﬁgures in Table 3 capture the expected costs of deviating from the eﬃcient level
of variables due to sticky-wages and prices in the face of ongoing shocks, expressed as a
percentage of steady-state consumption.










ρa =0 .6 1.1485 1.8770 2.0451 2.3121
ρa =0 .9 2.6735 3.5055 4.0023 5.3955
Of course these results are highly dependent upon the amount of inertia
in the economy. For example, the table shows that increasing the degree of
presistence in the technology shock from 0.6 to 0.9 such that the impacts of
shocks are felt for longer, implies that even with implementation lags ﬁscal
policy has a valuable role to play in stabilising the economy. Overall, these
results show the potential value of any measures that can be taken to reduce
implementation lags for ﬁscal instruments.11
6 Introducing Debt
In this section we consider the impact of introducing government debt into
our analysis of policy within a small open economy or within EMU12.U n t i l
now we have assumed that there was a lump-sum tax instrument which was
utilised to balance the budget whenever other ﬁscal instruments were used in a
stabilisation role. In this section we assume that any variations in government
spending or our sales or income tax instruments are not paid for in this way.
Instead, any inconsistency between government tax revenues and spending will
aﬀect government debt. Policy must then ensure that the relevant intertemporal
government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
In the case of EMU, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) derive the intertemporal
budget constraint for the union as a whole,
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where Bt is the aggregate level of the national debt stocks. With global market
clearing in asset markets the series of national budget constraints imply that
the only public-sector intertemporal budget constraint in our model is a union-
wide constraint. What is the intuition for this? Given complete capital markets
and our assumed initial conditions (zero net foreign assets and identical ex ante
structures in each economy) this means that initially consumers expect similar
ﬁscal policy regimes in their respective economies. To the extent that ex post
10These are expressed as percentages of one period’s steady-state consumption.
11This may be easier when lags are operational rather than political. However, in the
UK in the 1960s, when ﬁscal policy was actively used in demand management, the so called
‘regulator’ set aside sales taxes that could be changed by the government without the need to
obtain parliamentary approval, so as to reduce these lags.
12In Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005c), we consider more fully the signiﬁcance of adding debt
to New Keynesian models of monetary policy.
26this is not the case, there will be state contingent payments under IRS that
ensure marginal utilities are equated throughout the union (after controlling
f o rr e a le x c h a n g er a t ed i ﬀerences)13. This would seem to suggest that ﬁscal
sustainability questions within this framework are a union-wide rather than a
national concern. Given that a national government’s contribution to union-
wide ﬁnances is negligible then this could be taken to imply that debt is not an
issue in utilising ﬁscal instruments at the national level within EMU.
However, given the ﬁscal institutions which have been constructed as part
of EMU, it seems unlikely that without such constraints each member state
would expect to operate under ex ante similar ﬁscal regimes. Therefore it may
be reasonable to assume that each member state operates a budget constraint
of this form at the national level, such that there is no need for the only insti-
tution with a union-wide instrument, the ECB, to be concerned with issues of
ﬁscal solvency. Therefore we impose, as an external constraint created within
the institutions of EMU, a national government budget constraint of the same
form. We also need to transform this ‘national’ budget constraint into a log-
linearised ‘gap’ equation to allow it to be integrated into our policy problem.
Additionally, in order to support the assumption that the steady-state level of
output was eﬃcient (which was implicit in the welfare functions we developed)
an obvious assumption to make is that lump-sum taxation is used to ﬁnance the
steady-state subsidy (which oﬀsets, in steady-state, the distortions caused by
distortionary taxation and imperfect competition in wage and price setting). We
shall then assume that lump-sum taxation cannot be used to alter this subsidy
or to ﬁnance any other government activities, including the kind of spending
and distortionary tax adjustments as stabilisation measures we are interested
i n .T h i si m p l i e st h a tWi
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Tκi = Ti
T in all our economies at all points in time,













i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service
government debt as well as stabilise the economy. This deﬁnes the basic trade-
oﬀ facing policy makers in utilising these instruments.
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) show that this intertemporal budget con-
straint can give rise to log-linearised ﬂow dynamics of,
bi
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13For the purposes of illustration, suppose taxes were lump-sum and one economy unexpect-
edly cut all taxes to zero. There would be transfers from this economy to the other economies
to ensure that the consumers in the other economies were not disadvantaged by the higher
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This is our national government budget constraint, which must remain station-
ary as an additional constraint on policy makers.
6.1 Optimal Precommitment Policy with Government Debt
6.1.1 Small Open Economy Case
The Lagrangian associated with the open economy case in the presence of a
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Here monetary policy must now take account of its impact on the government’s
ﬁnances.














and for real wages,
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which implies that, E0λ
b,i
t = λ
b,i ∀t . In other words policy must ensure that
the ‘cost’ of the government’s budget constraint is constant following a shock,
which is the basis of the random walk result of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
This also implies that the lagrange multipliers for the wage and price phillips










































and the output gap,
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Combinations of these ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the national target criteria
for a variety of cases. In the open economy case the optimal combination of wage








This essentially describes the balance between wage and price adjustment in
achieving the new steady-state real wage consistent with the new steady-state
tax rates required to stabilise the debt stock following the shock. Taking the




b,i(−bτ(1 + ϕ)+( 1− β
−1)+by)=0 (148)
which deﬁnes the value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the govern-
ment’s budget constraint which implies that the output gap is constant, but
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t +( bτ − (1 − β
−1) − bg)λ
b,i =0 (151)
which is again constant given the lagrange multiplier λ
b,i .L e i t h a n d W r e n -
Lewis (2005c) show that this lagrange multiplier, associated with the budget
constraint, can be solved as a function of the size of the initial debt stock and
the expected ﬁscal repercussions of any modelled shock. They also investigate
the nature of the time inconsistency problem inherent in adding debt to the
model, which is discussed in the simulation section below.
Taken together these target criteria imply that optimal policy ensures that
output and government spending adjust instantaneously to their new steady-
state levels, while gradual price and wage adjustment implies that it is optimal,
under commitment, to gradually reach the new steady-state tax rates consistent
with debt sustainability.
6.1.2 EMU Case
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In order to obtain intuition for optimal policy in this case it is helpful to
relate the (constant) value of the lagrange multiplier associated with the na-
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30which also implies a constant relationship between the output and government
spending gaps following a shock.












and a sales-tax rule,
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which in conjuction with the tax rules, will achieve the constant relationship
between government spending and the output gap given above. Here we can
see that the presence of the national government budget constraint essentially
introduces a constant wedge into the target criteria outlined above for the EMU
case without debt which reﬂects the needs to adjust ﬁscal instruments and
steady-state output and real wages to be consistent with the new steady-state
level of government debt which follows a random walk.









Assuming that the national ﬁscal authorities will follow these ﬁscal rules, this
will ensure that union-wide monetary policy achieves the following balance be-








with other union wide variables following paths consistent with the target cri-
teria outlined for the small open economy case above.
6.2 Simulations with Debt
In this section we consider using numerical simulation the ability of an small
open economy operating inside and outside of EMU to stabilise the economy
31following a productivity shock through the use of ﬁscal instruments when it
must also ensure sustainability of the government’s ﬁnances. Figure 3 details
the paths of key endogenous variables following the same technology shock con-
sidered above when the economy is a member of monetary union and policy is
conducted under commitment, with and without government debt. When we
introduce debt, the results are very similar to the case where there was a lump-
sum tax instrument balancing the national ﬁscal budget. The main diﬀerence
is that there is a gradual reduction in government debt (this is shown in Figure
4) in response to the higher tax revenues generated by the positive productivity
shock, until it reaches its new lower steady-state with reduced sales and income
taxes and higher government spending to satisfy the national ﬁscal constraint.
This is essentially a generalisation of the random walk result of Benigno and
Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), which also has echoes
of tax smoothing (Barro (1979)), but with additional inertia caused by the var-
ious sources of inertia in the model. Therefore, following the shock we have a
random-walk in the steady-state debt and tax levels. However, these diﬀerences
have little impact on welfare, with the costs of the shock rising from 1.150% to
1.154% of one period’s steady-state consumption.
A more substantial diﬀerence occurs when we consider the discretionary so-
lution (see Figure 4). Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005c) show, in the context of
a closed economy model, that the time-inconsistency problem inherent in the
commitment solution is such that the ﬁscal authorities face the temptation of
using ﬁscal instruments to reduce the costs of sustaining a level of debt which
deviates from the ﬁrst best solution. Under discretion the national ﬁscal au-
thorities taking future inﬂationary expectations as given, respond to the same
incentives. For a positive technology shock this implies that they will reduce
taxes. In combination with a larger initial fall in inﬂation (resulting from the
negative cost-push eﬀects of reduced tax rates) and the reduced tax rates them-
selves serve to increase rather than reduce debt initially. This temptation, which
is a form of stabilisation bias, remains unless the debt stock returns to its ini-
tial value14 (this is demonstrated formerly in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005c)).
Therefore, even though there is no explicit debt target, optimal discretionary
policy eliminates the eﬀects of the productivity shock on the debt stock. Even
in this case, however, the welfare consequences of the shock are not dramati-
cally aﬀected by the introduction of government debt and welfare costs rise from
1.150% to 1.193% of one period’s steady-state consumption.
We can also consider the same experiment in the case of a small open econ-
omy operating outside of monetary union. Without the need to utilise dis-
tortionary instruments to ensure ﬁscal solvency we have already seen that the
combination of monetary and ﬁscal instruments can perfectly oﬀset the impact
of technology shocks in a sticky wage/price economy. However, when the gov-
ernment must also ensure ﬁscal sustainability by varying distortionary ﬁscal
14Ellison and Rankin (2005) ﬁnd, in the context of a ﬂex price closed economy model
that there is an unique level of debt which eliminates the time-inconsistency problem under
discretion. Our assumption that the steady-state is eﬃcient ensures that this coincides with
our initial steady-state level of debt.
32instruments this ﬁrst-best solution will no longer be attainable. The welfare
costs of our technology shock gives the welfare costs of having to stabilise debt
of only 0.0012% of one-period’s steady-state consumption under discretion, and
an insignﬁcant 1.23x10−4% under commitment.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have considered the potential role of various ﬁscal instruments in dealing
with technology and cost-push shocks in a microfounded open economy model
which contains both wage and price inertia. We looked at two policy regimes:
ﬂexible exchange rates and the case where the economy is a member of a ‘large’
monetary union. The three ﬁscal instruments we consider are government spend-
ing, income taxes and sales taxes.
I nt h ec a s eo fas m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y ,w h e na l lt h r e eﬁscal instruments are
freely available, then the impact of the technology shock on gap variables can
be completely eliminated, whether policy acts with discretion or commitment.
However, once any one of these ﬁscal instruments is excluded as a stabilisation
tool, signiﬁcant costs emerge. Using simulations, we ﬁnd that the useful ﬁscal
instrument in this case (in the sense of reducing the welfare costs of the shock)
is either income taxes or sales taxes. In constrast, having government spending
as an instrument contributes very little.
The results for an individual member of a monetary union facing an idiosyn-
cratic technology shock (where monetary policy in the union does not respond)
are very diﬀerent. First, even with all ﬁscal instruments freely available, the
technology shock will incur welfare costs. Government spending is potentially
useful as a stabilisation device, because it can act as a partial substitute for
monetary policy. Finally, sales taxes are more eﬀective than income taxes in
reducing the costs of a technology shock under monetary union. If all three
instruments are freely available, then the costs of the shock can be reduced by
around a half, compared to the case where there is no ﬁscal stabilisation. We
also found that implementation lags could signiﬁcantly aﬀect (but not elimi-
nate) the ability of ﬁscal instruments to deal with shocks, but that the need to
ensure ﬁscal solvency when utilising tax instruments in a stabilisation role had
negligible welfare consequences.
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36Appendix II - Target Criterion for Alternative Instrument Sets
for an EMU Member
Instruments Target Criterion
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Figure 1: Response to a 1% technology shock in an open economy with only
discretionary monetary policy as an instrument.
Note to Figure: An (N) suﬃx denotes natural (logarithmic) level of a variable, other-





Figure 2: Response to a 1% technology shock under EMU with no policy re-
sponse.
Note to Figure: An (N) suﬃx denotes natural (logarithmic) level of a variable, other-
wise all variables, other than inﬂation rates are logarithms of actual values.
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Response to a 1% technology shock under EMU, with and without ﬁscal policy.
Note to Figure: All variables are ‘gaps’. An (NR) suﬃx denotes no ﬁscal response, no
suﬃx denotes all ﬁscal instruments employed and the (Debt) suﬃx denotes the case
where all ﬁscal instruments are employed, but there are no-lump sum taxes available





Response to 1% technology shock under EMU with all ﬁscal instruments and
government debt.
Note to Figure: All variables are ’gaps’. An (C) suﬃx denotes commitment policy,
while no suﬃx denotes policy under discretion.
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